“The question of objectivity…as it relates to the problem of conflicting advice from scientific experts on matters of social importance is not properly a question of deciding in the abstract which expert is more objective. It is a concrete question of which expert’s version of objectivity is to be preferred.” – Randall Albury (1983), The Politics of Objectivity, p. 42

The world exists independently of the human mind, and we can know directly, if sometimes only approximately, how and what it is like through empirical investigation: this is the general assertion of scientific realism. Thus, it is both a metaphysical and an epistemological position. An accurate account of the physical world is possible, and science can provide it, as is evidenced by its consensually verifiable successes. Objectivity is the quality of accurately perceiving said independent world, undistorted by cognitive/perceptual interference. Put another way, the mental image/understanding corresponds to what is actually there. This is the correspondence theory of truth. Nature is being mirrored.

So far, so obvious, but the realist position was challenged as early as the late 19th century, when questions arose in the scientific community about the reality of molecules and atoms. However, the work on statistical mechanics and relativity of Planck and Einstein moved opinion back toward realism. Soon thereafter, quantum mechanics caused problems for a realist interpretation, which came to be seen as a metaphysical pseudo-question. This was compounded by the notion of the ‘theory-laden quality of observation’ propounded by W.V. Quine and Wilfred Sellars, which obviously is an impediment to simple objectivity. By the 1960s, though, the thinking on this had swung once again under the influence of realism with the ‘miracle argument,’ which states that if the entities of science were not real, the success of the enterprise would surely be a miracle. Since then, this viewpoint has also been challenged.

Some critics of the correspondence theory accuse it of vagueness (if a theory of the world is not offered) or circularity (if it is), but I find this argument to be itself nebulous. A better objection would be to say, as is more reasonable, that our awareness of the world in indirect, i.e., approximate; then, the criticism goes, we would then be talking about correspondence to an “idea” of the world, and hence, a “coherence” theory of truth. Scientific realists advance three major arguments in favor of their position: the aforementioned miracle argument (if our best theories were far from the truth, the fact that they are so successful would be miraculous); corroboration (different techniques of investigation detect the same entity); and selective optimism/skepticism (selecting the most cogent aspects of a theory of realism while discarding others). Antirealists have counter-arguments for each. Critics of scientific realism advance four major arguments: the underdetermination of theory by data (there must be empirically equivalent theories between which no evidence can decide): skepticism about inference to the best explanation (such inference being to regard as true that which explains best); pessimistic meta-induction to the instability of current science (a conclusion based on the repeated overthrow of scientific theories historically–a favorite theme of Kuhn and Feyerabend); and skepticism about approximate truth (a theory may be considered more approximately true than one that preceded it if the earlier theory can be described as a ‘limiting case’ of the later one). Again, there are responses to these points as well.

The two philosophers of science probably best known to the general public are Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, the former a proponent of “normal” science, famous for this idea of falsification as a guide to the validity of a theoretical claim (to be scientific, a theory must be capable of being shown to be false (Marxism, psychoanalysis, and astrology, e.g., would not qualify)). For Kuhn, science does not proceed with a steady, cumulative movement toward greater enlightenment, but experiences irrational, revolutionary discontinuities periodically. Imre Lakatos, a student of Popper, tried to find a middle ground between these two extremes, replacing Kuhn’s “paradigms” with the idea of “research programs.” Despite revolutions, Lakatos argued, a common hard core of theory and techniques is preserved and protected from falsification by a “belt of auxiliary hypotheses”. Paul Feyerabend, like Lakatos, a student of Popper, was even more radical than Kuhn: he advocated “epistemological anarchism”, based largely on this analysis of anomalies in the history of science, which supposedly shows that the highly esteemed “scientific method” has not been consistently adhered to, the rules have been continually  broken, and so, actually, it’s “anything goes”. From this he concluded that science as an institution does not deserve its privileged status in western society. However, Feyerabend was no mystic; he accepted the doctrine of eliminative materialism. Also, some critics have called into question the soundness of his historical analysis. But his charge of “scientific imperialism” is important as well as reminiscent of the influential work of Michel Foucault on the relationship between power and knowledge in society.

Since the 1980s, more sophisticated defenses of scientific ANTI-realism have been advanced by, among others, American philosophers Bas van Fraassen and Larry Laudan. Van Fraassen calls his version “constructive empiricism” (i.e., assuming an instrumental/pragmatic attitude toward unobservables without actually committing to a belief in their existence). Laudan developed a stronger version of Feyerabend’s historicism.

We come up against the real world in our scientific practices, even though the truth of our theories about it may remain a matter of speculation. In the end, is it not reasonable to ask if it really matters if “absolute reality” can be philosophically established so long as science remains successful at predicting the world and actually achieving desired or  acceptable results through applications? Anyone finding it unreasonable would have to be clear about any dire consequences which might ensue as a result of rejecting, or at least being agnostic about a formal, metaphysical foundation for scientific activity.

~ Wm. Doe, Ph.D., January, 2016